Pledging Life Insurance: Interest of the Beneficiary as Against the Estate of the Insured by Speidel, Harry W.
Volume 51 
Issue 4 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 51, 
1946-1947 
6-1-1947 
Pledging Life Insurance: Interest of the Beneficiary as Against the 
Estate of the Insured 
Harry W. Speidel 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
Harry W. Speidel, Pledging Life Insurance: Interest of the Beneficiary as Against the Estate of the Insured, 
51 DICK. L. REV. 255 (1947). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol51/iss4/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
PLEDGING LIFE INSURANCE: INTEREST OF THE BENEFICIARY
AS AGAINST THE ESTATE OF THE INSURED
An interesting problem arises out of a situation common to most present day
life insurance loan transactions. The common situation in such transactions is
briefly this: X is insured under a life insurance policy having a maturity value of
$1,000.00. His wife, Y, is the beneficiary of the policy. X goes to his bank and
borrows $500.00. As collateral security for the loan X assigns the life insur-
ance policy to the bank. The policy contains the usual provisions giving the
insured the right to assign the policy and to change the beneficiary. X then dies.
The proceeds of the policy are paid to the bank which deducts the $500.00 due
it, and pays the balance left over to Y, the beneficiary. As between the creditor-
assignee and the beneficiary, the law seems well fixed in most jurisdictions that
the beneficiary is entitled to only such amount of the proceeds of the policy as
remain after the claim of the assignee has been satisfied (that is to say, the
balance due, at the time of the insured's death, on the debt to secure which the
policy had been assigned).1 That is the common situation; it is after this point
that the problem arises which is the subject of this article.
Let us return again to the hypothetical situation above. Y, the beneficiary,
disappointed (especially so where the insured's estate is solvent and well able to
pay all his debts) by reason of having received only $500.00 when she had reason-
ably expected to receive $1,000.00, now files claim against the estate of her
deceased husband for the sum of $500.00. The disposition of this claim is
the problem which is to be" considered below.
At first blush the answer seems obvious, for even a mere cursory search of
the leading text authorities discloses: "The beneficiary of an insurance policy
takes no vested interest; that which he has is a mere expectancy''2 (quotes mine).
Ergo-the wife-beneficiary cannot recover on her claim against the estate of her
husband since said claim is based on nothing more than a disappointed hope.
However the answer is not as simple as it at first appears, a fact which will be
amply demonstrated by the cases to be examined herein below. Suffice it now
to point out that, first, there is not a great deal of case authority directly in point'
second, the case authority which exists is of comparatively recent origin; and
third, said case authority is widely split into opposing views.
The first point of departure from what has been alluded to above as the
obvious answer to the problem is to be found in the situation where a suretyship
relation exists between the insured, as principal, and the beneficiary, as surety.
1Davis vs. Modern Industrial Bank, 279 N. Y. 405; Landreth vs. 1st. National Bank (1943),
346 Pa. 551; Smith vs. Coleman (Va. 1945), 35 S. E. 2d. 107.
2Appleman: Insurance Law and Practice, Vol. II, p. 309; Richards: Law of Insurance, p. 564.
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In such a case some courts have permitted the beneficiary to recover from the
estate of the insured all of the policy proceeds which had been applied to the
payment of the debts of the insured for which the policy had been pledged.
Such recovery has been predicted upon the beneficiary's special right of sub-
rogation which accrued to him by virtue of the suretyship relation. The case of
Russell vs. Owen (1932), 203 N. C. 262, 165 S. E. 687 is illustrative of the
principles involved. In this case the decedent, D. S. Owen, borrowed $6,000.00
from the Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, for which said
Owen and his wife executed their bond, he as principal debtor, and she as surety. In
order to secure this bond D. S. Owen and his wife executed a deed of trust
covering certain lands owned by Owen. The Equitable Life Assurance Society
of the United States issued a policy of insurance upon the life of D. S. Owen
in the sum of $6,000.00. As additional security for the loan this policy was
immediately assigned to the Society by the insured and his wife who was the
beneficiary named therein. The policy contained the usual provisions giving
the insured the right to change the beneficiary and to assign the policy. Upon
the death of the insured the proceeds of the policy were applied to discharg-
ing the debt of $6,000.00 owed by the insured to the Life Assurance Society.
The wife then sued to recover the $6,000.00 from the estate of the insured,
claiming that she was subrogated to the rights of the creditor. In disposing of
this case the appellate court sustained the theory advanced by the wife-bene-
ficiary in the following language:
"In the instant case, no change of beneficiary having been
made by the insured while the policy was in force, the interest
of Violet Owen, as beneficiary named in the policy, ceased
to be contingent upon the death of the insured; upon his death
it ripened into a vested interest, with the result that, subject
only to the rights of the creditor . . . under the assign-
ment .. . the proceeds of the policy became and were the
property of Violet Owen, free from all claims of the repre-
sentatives of her husband or any of his creditors.
The policy was assigned as additional security (italics
mine) for the bond executed by the insured as principal, and
the beneficiary as surety ...The bond was paid out of the
proceeds of the insurance. Thus the property of the surety
: * .was applied to the payment of the bond on which the
insured was liable as principal. By reason of these facts Violet
Owen became a creditor of the estate of her husband in the
amount paid out of her property. As such creditor she is
entitled to be subrogated to all the rights of the Equitable
Life Assurance Society." 3
It is further to be noted in this case, that, even though the court recognized
the generally accepted rule that the beneficiary of this type of insurance policy
8Accord: Katz vs. Ohio National Bank (1934), 127 Ohio 531, 191 N. E. 782.
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takes not a vested interest but only a mere expectancy therein, still, this was
held not to be a bar to recovery by the wife-beneficiary in this particular fact-
situation.
There are other cases which depart even farther from the obvious answer
to the problem which was alluded to early in this discussion. These cases do
not limit recovery by the beneficiary to situations where a suretyship relation
exists between the insured as principal, and the beneficiary as surety. The New
Hampshire case of Barbin vs. Moore (1932), 159 A. 409 will serve as an illus-
tration. In this case one George Leclerc had taken out two policies of insurance
upon his life. His daughters were named as the beneficiaries in the policies. Each
policy contained the usual provisions for change of beneficiary and assign-
ment of the policy. Sometime later the insured assigned both policies to a bank
as additional collateral security, in the event of his death, for a loan of $9,000.00,
which was also secured by a mortgage on his real estate. Afterwards Leclerc
made payments on the loan, so that at the time of his death there was due
the bank the sum of $7,762.94. The insurance company paid that sum to the
bank, and the bank discharged the mortgage. The administrator of the insured's
estate sold the real estate for $9,025.00. The guardian of the daughter-bene-
ficiaries then sued on their behalf to recover $7,762.94 from the insured's estate.
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire in a very able opinion pointed out that
the problem finally resolves itself into a question of intent. What was the
intent of the insured when he assigned the policy as collateral security? Was
it his intent to thereby make the proceeds of the policy the primary fund from
which the debt should be paid? The court points out the improbability of this
result in the following language:
"The root of the defendant's claim is that in some way
the decedent made the insurance policies payable for the
benefit of his estate to the extent of the mortgage debt. The
improbability of the existence of such a purpose is a fact to
be considered in determining the extent to which the execu-
tion of the power of disposal goes. He desired to borrow mon-
ey, and evidently had to furnish more security than the mort-
gaged real estate would afford. More security to the lender
was all he needed, and apparently all he undertook to ap-
propriate. There is no evidence of any purpose to change the
relation between his estate and the insurance money. there
can hardly be any doubt that if the real estate security had
been ample the policies would not have been pledged .... Col-
lateral means secondary or subsidiary (italics mine). Such se-
curity is to be resorted to only in the event that the pledgor
fails to perform the principal contract. A pledge as col-
lateral security ex vi termini excludes the idea that the thing
pledged is designed as the primary source from which pay-
ment is to be made. .. . If he had wished to have the insur-
ance go to pay the debt in any event and to the enrichment
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of his estate, he could have made his creditor the designated
beneficiary to the extent of its claim. His failure to do this
is significant of his purpose in the execution of the power.
It evidences his design to secure his prospective creditor,
and at the same time not to impair the beneficiaries' title
beyond what was necessary to protect the lender."
Having found that it was not the insured's intent, by a mere assignment
of the policy as collateral security, to make the policy proceeds primarily liable
for the insured's debt, the court then proceeds to examine the nature of the
beneficiaries' rights in the policy. The findings on this point are based, to a
considerable degree, upon the New Hampshire Insurance-Proceeds Exemption
Statute. 4 The pertinent part of that statute is as follows:
"When a policy of insurance is effected by a person on
his life, or the life of another, expressed to be for the benefit
of a third person or his representatives, the party for whose
benefit such policy is so expressed to be made shall be entitled
to the sum so insured, against the claims of the creditors or re-
presentatives of the party effecting the same." 5
The court then defines the rights of the beneficiaries in the following lang-
uage:
"The right to assign or pledge is superior to the right
of the named beneficiaries, but the latter may be called the
residuary right, and it constitutes a legal claim upon all of the
title that has not been disposed of in the exercise of the su-erior right. . . . A right of present enjoyment accrued to the
beneficiaries upon the death of the insured. The right ex-
tended to the entire sum due under the policies. It had never
been cut down in amount. The only incumbrance upon it was
the pledge as collateral for the debt of the insured. . . . A
fundamental error in the defendant's argument is the assump-
tion that the assignment as collateral was an extinguishment,
pro tanto, of the beneficiaries' rights. It was not that, but only
an incumbrance of these rights. By force of the statute they
(the rights of the beneficiaries) 0 are superior to the rights of
his estate and creditors."
Needless-to-say the beneficiaries were permitted to recover in this case, even
though their recovery made the estate of the insured insolvent. Assignment of
the policies as collateral security did not indicate an intent to make the policy
proceeds the primary fund for the payment of the debt, nor did such assign-
mient destroy pro tanto the rights of the beneficiaries. Therefore, as between
the estate of the insured and the beneficiaries, it was the obligation of the estate
to pay the debt of the insured. The property of the beneficiaries having been
4New Hampshire P. L. C. 277 Sec. 2.
6Ibid.
6Parenthetical phrase my addition.
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used to discharge this debt, they were subrogated to all the creditor's rights against
the estate of the insured.
Further support for the principles laid down in Barbin vs. Moore can be
found in equally lucid expression in the New York case of Chamberlin vs. The
First Trust & Deposit Company (1939), 15 N. Y. Supp. 2d. 168, 172 Misc. 472.
The facts here were substantially those of our hypothetical situation so there
is no need to recount them in detail. However the acuity with which the court
looks thru the facts to the fundamental issues involved is worthy of specific no-
tice. First, on the question of the insured's intent, the court had the following
to say:
"I do not think that the mere assignment of the policies
in this case constituted a direction to the insurance company
to pay the note to the lender trust company. Chamberlin
could very easily have accomplished that, had he so desired.
He could have made the lender trust company the beneficiary
of the policies. He could have indicated in some way that
the insurance money should be the primary fund from which
the note was to be paid. He could have revoked the designa-
tion of his wife as beneficiary, and re-designated her the bene-
ficiary of the policies subject to the assignments, thereby dimin-
ishing her interest in the policies pro tanto, in which case
. . . the lender trust company would have been constituted
the primary beneficiary and the wife the secondary bene-
ficiary."
Second, on the question of the beneficiary's interest, and of the effect of
the pledge on that interest; the court says:
"Collateral security in bank phraseology means, some
security additional to the personal obligation of the borrower.7
The effect of the assignment was to place a pledgee's lien
against the proceeds of the policies. The purpose of this lien
was to stand behind the insured's primary obligation to pay
his note. The expectant or inchoate interest of the wife be-
came absolute at the death of the insured, subject only to the
pledgee's lien. The insured's death did not affect the nature
of this lien. If it wias a pledge as collateral only during the
insured's lifetime, it was no more than that after his death."8
Having thus resolved the two main issues in the case the court phrased its
conclusion in the following terms:
"If, then, the insured pledged these policies for security
additional to the primary obligation which was his promise to
pay, and if it be held that the collateral could not be used
unless and until there was default in performing the primary
7The court quoting Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd. Edition, p. 349.
8ltalics mine.
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obligation, it follows that the primary fund from which the
note should be paid was his estate, in the absence of a clear
and unequivocal direction to the contrary."
It may be observed, then, at this point, that all of the foregoing cases would
solve our hypothetical problem by permitting the beneficiary to recover from
the estate of the insured whatever amount of the insurance proceeds had been
applied to the payment of the insured's debt.
This, however, is apparently not the view which would be taken in Penn-
sylvania. The very few cases which purport to declare the Pennsylvania Law
in regard to our problem seem to hold that an assignment of a policy as collateral
security has the effect of extinguishing pro tanto the rights of the beneficiary
in the proceeds of the policy. A clear statement of this view is to be found in
the case of Cassel vs. Bigler (1934), 22 D. & C. 125. Here a bill in equity
was filed by the creditor-assignee to compel the widow-beneficiary and the ad-
niinistrators of the insured to interplead for the purpose of determining the
ownership to certain collateral in the hands of the creditor-assignee, the loan
having been paid out of the proceeds of the life insurance. The facts here
were again substantially those of our hypothetical situation.
The court (Clearfield County), although it recognized the authority of the
cases set forth above in detail, found that the Law of Pennsylvania was other-
wise. Its statement of that Law is as follows:
"As we construe this decision, 10 it evidences the view
of the Supreme Court that when once the insured takes away
from the expectancy previously granted to his beneficiary
some part or all of it and conveys it, even though by way of
lien rather than absolutely, to another person, his action must
be held to bar the expectancy to that extent; or, to state it other-
wise, when he resorts to the insurance policies and makes them
assets for the payment of his debts, he has in effect made them
an asset of his estate for all purposes to the extent so charged,
the measure of that extent being the amount of the loan....
In our opinion, therefore, when A. Wright Bigler added his
life insurance to the collateral securities which he had already
pledged with the bank, he made it a part of his estate to the
extent of the loan and the act of the pledgee in obtaining
payment of the loan out of the insurance proceeds would not
by subrogation divest the ownership of the decedent in the
collateral securities still held, but they would remain as before
the property of A. Wright Bigler, now vested by reason of his
death in his administrators."
OAccord: Smith vs. Coleman (Va. 1945), 35 S. E. 2d. 107.
1OFidelity Trust Co., Administrator vs. Union National Bank of Pittsburgh (1933), 313 Pa. 467.
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The sole authority on which the County Court based the sweeping and un-
equivocal decision quoted above is the case of The Fidelity Trust Co., Admin-
istrator vs. The Union National Bank of Pittsburgh (1933), 313 Pa. 467. The
County Court in the Cassel case recites the facts of the Fidelity Trust Co. case
to be substantially these:
The insured had created a life insurance trust, the trustees of which were
the beneficiaries of certain life insurance policies. These particular policies were
found to have been so deposited and the beneficiaries so designated at a time
when the insured was solvent, and the question of a conveyance in fraud of
creditors which was involved in some of the other items in the same case was
held not to apply to the policies in question. Subsequently, after becoming
insolvent, the insured made an agreement with an Ohio bank which required
the trustees to purchase certain notes, upon which he was indebted to it, after
his death, this agreement being found by the court to be in effect, though not in
form, an assignment of the proceeds of the policies. The Ohio bank held other
collateral securities for the payment of its indebtedness of $200,000.00 and sold
these securities realizing thereon sufficient to reduce the indebtedness to the bank
to $57,494.20. The administrators sued to recover the $200,000.00 as against
the trustees and the wife and children of the insured, who were the beneficiaries
of the insurance trust. The lower court gave $57,494.20 to the administrators
of the insured, and the balance to the beneficiaries of the policies. The Supreme
Court gave the entire $200,000.00 to the administrators of the insured.
In the Cassel case the court was presented with the argument that the re-
sult reached in the Fidelity Trust Co. case was based upon the fact that a fraudu-
lent conveyance was involved there. In order to bolster its decision the court
rejected this view of the Fidelity Trust Co. case, and in its statement of the
facts of that case, as set out above, sought to preclude any objections along those
lines. For several reasons the writer of this article is unable to agree with the
County Court in its construction of the Fidelity Trust Co. decision. First of all,
the editor of the State Reports, in his syllabus of the Fidelity Trust Co. case,
definitely states that the assignment to the Ohio bank was held to be a fraudu-
lent conveyance. Though it is admitted that this can be no authority, still it is
evidence that one mind not unfamiliar with the law and the interpretation of
decisions took a different view from that of the County Court. Secondly, the
Supreme Court expressly cites, at two places in its opinion, the finding of the
chancellor that the deal with the Ohio bank was a fraudulent conveyance. At
no point in the opinion is this finding overruled, nor does the Supreme Court
say anywhere that its opinion is not based upon this finding. And thirdly, with
the exception of the Cassel case, the Fidelity Trust Co. case has never been cited
by any subsequent cases as standing for the proposition which the Cassel case
says it does. All the cases which Shepards list as citing the Fidelity Trust Co.
case are cases where a fraudulent conveyance was involved.
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Let us examine more closely the opinion in the Cassel case. The court
says that when the insured assigns the proceeds of the policy as collateral se-
curity he in effect makes such proceeds assets of his estate to the extent so charged,
the measure of that extent being the amount of the loan. Suppose that the in-
sured had originally borrowed $1000.00, pledging as collateral his life insurance
policy in the amount of $1000.00. During his lifetime he pays back $900.00, so
that at the time of his death only $100.00 is still owing. According to the
language of the Cassel opinion the estate of the insured would be entitled to the
$900.00 in preference to the beneficiary named in the policy. What could be
farther from the intent of the insured when he pledged his insurance than this
result? The word 'collateral' by definition and connotation is absolutely irre-
concilable with the result that must inevitably follow the view taken by the court
in the Cassel case. If the insured had changed the beneficiary in the policy
then the result reached in the Cassel case can be defended, but not so where all
that the insured did was to assign the policy as collateral security. This rule
is recognized universally: That the excess of the proceeds of the policies over
and above the indebtedness belongs to the beneficiary named in the policies and
not to the estate of the insured. 1 Thus it becomes apparent that the language
of the Cassel case is unduly broad, and even goes beyond what would be re-
quired to justify the disposition of the insurance money in that case.
Let us turn now to the language of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
the Fidelity Trust Co. case on which the Cassel case based its result.
"The right of the wife and children to participate in the
insurance was an expectancy measured by the policies and the
insurance trust agreements. One of the conditions of the
donor's gift was that, by exercise of the power expressly re-
served, he might destroy altogether the expectancy of his wife
and children."
Quite true; moreover, all the cases referred to in the early part of this
article would agree with this statement by the Pennsylvania Court. But, a
destruction of the expectancy is accomplished by a change of beneficiary, not
by a mere assignment. Most courts which run afield at this point do so by reason
of their failure to distinguish between these two alternate acts of the insured.
Assignment is purely a contract act. Change of beneficiary is the exercise of a
power to appoint.' 2 To treat an assignment as having the same effect as a
change of beneficiary is to ignore the facts and make a fundamental error. This
amounts to conforming the facts to jibe with a predetermined result, rather than
permitting the result to be determined by the facts.
Let us look further at the language of the Supreme Court.
"By the Ohio bank agreement, he diminished the con-
IlLandreth vs. First National Bank, 346 Pa. 551; Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co. vs. Meguire,
13 Fed. Supp. 967; Allen vs. Home National Bank, 120 Conn. 306, 180 A. 498; Chamber-
lin vs. First Trust & Deposit Co., 15 N. Y. Supp. 2d. 168.
1
2
Katz vs. Ohio National Bank (1934), 127 Ohio 351, 191 N. E. 782.
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tingent benefiicial interest theretofore conferred on his family,
and subordinated that interest in the insurance proceeds to the
extent of the loan and interest."
This language is entirely consistent with the view taken by the cases set
forth in the early part of this article. Diminished and subordinated certainly
do not mean extinguished and wiped out completely, but they are harmonious
with the view that the residuary rights of the beneficiary remained, subordinate
only to the rights of the assignee. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania has said
this very thing in a later case:
"Whatever interest the beneficiary may have, he or she
is not completely deprived thereof by an assignment, but is
subject to the right of the creditor until the debt is paid."' 13
The opinion in the Fidelity Trust Co. case concludes with the following
words which further belie the view taken by the County'Court in the Cassel case:
"The record shows that the donor did not intend to de-
prive his family of the benefit of the insurance except as to
the interest granted to the Ohio bank. . . here the evidence is
conclusive that he sought to keep as much of the proceeds as
possible vithin the statutory exemption from creditors and
separate from his estate which was not exempt."
If all that the insured took away from his family's interest in the insurance
proceeds was the interest that he gave to the Ohio bank how can he be said
to have given any interest to his estate? The two propositions cannot be recon-
ciled.
In conclusion the writer submits that, after a study of the Fidelity Trust Co.
case, it cannot be said with conviction that said case is in fact an ajudication of
the insurance problem which has been considered herein. Though it is admitted
that there is ample language in the case seemingly in point, it is earnestly be-
lieved that the case was disposed of solely on the basis of the fraudulent con-
veyance involved therein. It then must follow that the answer to our problem
is still an open question in Pennsylvania, and one which might well be sub-
mitted to the Supreme Court for their express determination. Keeping in mind
the public policy behind our insurance proceeds exemption statute, 14 looking
closely at the intent of the insured in these transactions, and not forgetting the
distinct nature of collateral security, it is urged that the answer to this insurance
problem might well be determined in. Pennsylvania along lines similar to the
view taken in the New York and New Hampshire cases discussed at the be-
ginning of this article. It is the.I writer's confirmed opinion that these cases
reach not only the most equitable resilt, but also the result best sustained by
"he logic of good law.
HARRY W. SPEIDEL
13Lemley vs. McClure (1936), 122 Pa. Super 225.
14Act of June 28, 1923. P. L. 884, No. 335 Sec. 1; 40 P. S. 517.
